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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3259
________________
TIMOTHY A. HALE,
                  Appellant
   v.
CHIEF SECRETARY JEFFREY BEARD,
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;
DENTAL DEPARTMENT, SCI Rockview;
INMATE ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCI Rockview;
SUPERINTENDANT F.J. TENNIS
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-02704)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 14, 2006
BEFORE: BARRY, STAPLETON and GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: February 27, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
     1 Hale’s claims are based on what is commonly known as Act 84, pursuant to which
“wages, salaries and commissions of individuals” may be attached “[f]or restitution to
crime victims, costs, fines or bail judgments pursuant to an order entered by a court in a
criminal proceeding.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8127(a)(5) (West 2005).  Act 84 permits
the county correctional facility or Department of Corrections “to make monetary
deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any
other court-ordered obligation.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9728(b)(5) (West 2005).  That
section also authorizes the Department of Corrections to develop guidelines for this
procedure, see id., which it has done.  See DC-ADM 005-1.
2
Timothy Hale, a prisoner incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at
Rockview (“SCI-Rockview”) in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, appeals pro se the dismissal for
failure to state a claim of his action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In his Amended
Complaint, Hale alleged that defendants’ withdrawal of money from his prison account
pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9728(b)(5) and DC ADM-005 violated his right to
due process under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.1  Hale sought a declaration
that his rights were being violated by defendants’ actions, an injunction barring
defendants from continuing to seize money from his prison account, compensatory and
punitive damages, and costs.
The District Court dismissed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The Court held that, because
Hale did not articulate a constitutional basis for the alleged violation, he failed to state a
claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The Court went on to note that, to the extent
Hale’s Complaint could be construed to allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the claim could not be pursued in a § 1983 action under Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
     2 It is unclear whether Hale received notice of the Court’s dismissal, as he attempted
to file a supplemental complaint on March 7, 2005.  In an order entered on March 9, the
District Court denied Hale’s motion to file a supplemental complaint based upon its
dismissal of the Amended Complaint on February 8.
     3 Pursuant to Rule 58(b)(2)(B), the dismissal became a final judgment on July 8,
2005, 150 days after entry on the civil docket.  The notice of appeal was filed on June 16,
2005.  A notice of appeal which is filed after the court announces a decision or order but
before it enters a judgment is treated as if it was filed on the date of entry of the judgment. 
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2).
3
(1984), because the State of Pennsylvania provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy
for the alleged wrong.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court dismissed Hale’s
Amended Complaint on February 8, 2005.2  On March 16, 2005, Hale filed a motion for
reconsideration in which he stated the legal basis for the arguments set forth in his
Amended Complaint.  The District Court denied his motion for reconsideration on May
23, 2005.  Hale filed a notice of appeal on June 16, 2005.  Because the District Court did
not enter a separate judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 when it
dismissed the action, the notice of appeal was timely as to both the dismissal Order and
the denial of Hale’s motion for reconsideration.3
Hale initially argued to the District Court that there was no court order mandating
the payment of costs, fines, or restitution.  On appeal, however, he admits that his
sentence included costs, fines, and restitution.  There is no copy of the sentencing order in
the record.
We have repeatedly held that a prisoner has a protected property interest in the
4funds held in his inmate account.  See, e.g., Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 693 (3d Cir.
2002); Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Nonetheless, the District Court held that Hale’s due process claims were barred under
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), because the State of Pennsylvania provides an
adequate post-deprivation remedy for such a wrong.  We have rejected this line of
reasoning, holding that “‘[i]n situations where the State feasibly can provide a
predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do so regardless of the
adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking.’”  Higgins, 293
F.3d at 693-94 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990)).  In Higgins,
where funds were being deducted from plaintiff’s account pursuant to a state statute, we
concluded that “[plaintiff] was entitled to notice and hearing before the [defendants]
deducted money from his account.” Id. at 694.  The availability of post-deprivation state
court proceedings thus does not bar Hale’s federal procedural due process claim.
Having determined that Hale may seek to enforce his due process rights in the
context of a § 1983 action, we now consider whether Hale has been accorded adequate
process.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently spoken on the issue of what
process is due in this situation.  In Buck v. Beard, 583 Pa. 431, 877 A.2d 157 (2005), the
Court considered a challenge by inmate Darryl Buck to the withdrawal of funds from his
prison account for court costs, fines, and restitution pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
9728(b)(5).  Buck argued that due process required an individualized judicial
determination of his ability to pay before the Department of Corrections could deduct
5payments from his account for fines, costs, or restitution.  Id. at ___, 877 A.2d at 159-60. 
The Court rejected Buck’s position, holding that because the statute became effective two
years prior to the imposition of his sentence, and because he had been afforded an
opportunity to present evidence at his sentencing hearing to persuade the court not to
impose fines, costs, or restitution, he had received sufficient notice and an opportunity to
be heard to satisfy the requirements of due process.  Id. at ___; 877 A.2d at 160.  The
Court therefore concluded that, under the circumstances, the application of section
9728(b)(5) did not violate Buck’s right to due process.  Id. at ___; 877 A.2d at 162.
We have not yet addressed the specific issue of what constitutes due process under
the federal Constitution in this situation.  Traditionally, in assessing a procedural due
process claim, we will balance the private interest, the governmental interest, and the
value of the available procedure in safeguarding against an erroneous deprivation of
property.  See Tillman, 221 F.3d at 421; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).  Absent “extraordinary circumstances,” we have usually found that due process
requires predeprivation notice and a hearing.  See Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694; Tillman, 221
F.3d at 421-22.  While we ultimately may conclude, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
did, that the existence of the statute and the proceedings attendant to sentencing provide
sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard to satisfy the requirements of due process,
we are reluctant to address this issue without first hearing argument from the
Commonwealth.  As the District Court dismissed this action prior to service of the
Complaint, we will vacate and remand for further proceedings.  Upon remand, the District
6Court may wish to consider whether the appointment of counsel to represent plaintiff
would be appropriate.
